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Abstract
We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits
that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize
imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty
directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement
strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort,
and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.
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1. Introduction
Whether pollution sources should be allowed to bank or borrow transferable emissions permits, and what restrictions should be placed on this activity are fundamental design choices for market-based pollution control. We examine theoretically
the compliance incentives and enforcement of an emissions trading program when
emissions permits can be banked for future use or borrowed against future permit
holdings. There are several emissions trading programs that allow some form of
permit banking and borrowing; the most well known is the Sulfur Dioxide (SO2 )
Allowance Trading program, which allows unrestricted banking of permits, but not
borrowing. Pollution sources have made good use of this feature of the SO2 program, banking just over 30% of the total allocation of SO2 allowances during
Phase I of the program (1995–1999).1 At the same time, all sources in the SO2
program were perfectly compliant (US EPA 2000). There have been a few minor
incidences of noncompliance since then, but by the measure of maintaining compliance the enforcement apparatus of the SO2 program has been very successful
(US EPA 2003a).
Policy analysts usually point to two features of the SO2 program to explain
its success in inducing and maintaining near-perfect compliance (e.g., Swift 2001;
Stranlund et al. 2002; US EPA 2003b). First, should a source fail to hold sufﬁcient allowances to cover its emissions in a compliance period it is automatically assessed a ﬁnancial penalty, the unit value of which has always been many
times higher than going allowance prices. Second, all facilities in the program are
required to install a continuous emissions monitoring system which generates and
submits quarterly emissions reports to the EPA. These systems are fully automated, thereby minimizing the opportunities for submitting false emissions data.
Two additional program features may be partly responsible for the high rate of
compliance. In addition to facing a high ﬁnancial penalty, a ﬁrm’s excess emissions
in one period are offset by a one-to-one deduction from its allocation of permits
in the next period. Finally, misreporting of emissions is a separate violation in the
SO2 program that is distinct from the failure to hold sufﬁcient permits, although
there is not an explicit penalty for reporting violations.2
Although the SO2 program has been successful in achieving near-perfect compliance, the relative contribution of each of these enforcement features to its success
has not been examined. For that reason, it is not at all clear to what extent similar
measures could effectively be applied in other pollution control situations; in particular, those situations in which perfect monitoring is not possible or simply too
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For an empirical examination of banking behavior in the SO2 program see Ellerman and Montero
(2002).
2 See section 412(e) of the Title IV (SO2 Allowance) regulations;
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/arp/regs/index.html. Stranlund et al. (2002) provide a detailed account
of the enforcement strategy of the SO2 program and a comparison to the enforcement strategy of
the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) program.

expensive. In this paper, we construct a dynamic model of compliance in emissions
trading programs to examine the design of enforcement when emissions permits
are bankable and when monitoring of emissions need not be perfect.3 We focus on
enforcement strategies that induce perfect compliance with minimal enforcement
costs.4 Like most analysts we assume that setting penalties is costless, but monitoring is not. Since we focus on inducing perfect compliance, no costs of collecting
penalties are incurred: therefore, minimizing enforcement costs means minimizing
monitoring effort.
The main contribution of our analysis is to uncover the importance of detecting
and punishing under-reported emissions. It is clear that compliance in trading programs with bankable permits and imperfect monitoring requires self-reported emissions with a separate penalty for misreporting. This is distinct from most of the
literature on self-reporting in law enforcement, which assumes that self-reporting
is a voluntary activity that can be encouraged by offering a lower penalty for selfreported violations. In fact, in most of the models in this literature self-reporting
is not necessary to achieve compliance.5 However, for an emissions trading program with bankable permits and imperfect monitoring, self-reporting of emissions
is required simply because, if a ﬁrm is not monitored in a particular period, its
report is the only available information on its emissions to determine how many
permits are used for current compliance and how many are carried into the next
period. Moreover, the misreporting violation must be distinct from a permit violation, in which a ﬁrm fails to hold sufﬁcient permits to cover its emissions. When
emissions permits can be banked but not borrowed, an important type of noncompliance occurs when a ﬁrm that holds enough permits to cover its emissions in a
period still under-reports its emissions to generate additional permits for its permit bank. Offering a lower penalty for truthful self-revelation of permit violations
cannot deter this sort of noncompliance.
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Following Kling and Rubin (1997) we use the term “banking” to mean saving permits for future
use and “borrowing” to mean borrowing permits from future permit holdings. “Bankable permits”
refers to policies that allow banking only, or both banking and borrowing.
4 Our focus on inducing perfect compliance is motivated by the high rates of compliance in
well-known emissions trading programs like the SO2 Allowance Trading, RECLAIM, and the
NOX Budget Trading programs. It is clear that the enforcement strategies for these programs were
designed to achieve high rates of compliance. Since achieving high compliance rates appears to be
an important objective for policymakers, it is worth analyzing how to accomplish this objective
with minimal enforcement costs. Moreover, given certainty about abatement costs, as we assume in
our model, and the freedom to choose penalties and permit allocations without restrictions,
designing an efﬁcient emissions trading program that involves perfect compliance is always
possible. This is not to say that analyzing imperfect compliance in dynamic emissions trading
programs is unimportant; however, we leave that to future investigations.
5 However, analysts have identiﬁed several reasons why self-reporting can conserve enforcement and
compliance costs. See Malik (1993), Kaplow and Shavell (1994), Livernois and McKenna (1999),
and Innes (1999, 2000, 2001). Each of these works models a lower penalty for reported violations.
Like our model, Harford (1987), Stranlund and Chavez (2000), and Chavez and Stranlund (2003)
make misreporting of emissions a separate violation with its own penalty.

Furthermore, our analysis suggests that emphasizing a high unit penalty for permit
violations, as in the SO2 program, is not warranted. When permit borrowing is not
allowed, a permit violation penalty has only limited deterrence value; increasing this
penalty does not reduce the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance. In fact, we show that setting this penalty at a high level may actually increase
the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance, because it increases
the incentive ﬁrms have to under-report their emissions. In any period but the ﬁnal
period of a program without permit borrowing, the permit violation penalty should
be set to just make up the difference between the current period permit price and
the present value of next period’s permit price. Of course, when both permit banking
and borrowing are allowed, there should be no permit violation penalty in periods
before the last, because emissions in excess of permit holdings do not constitute a
violation in these periods. In contrast, whether or not permit borrowing is allowed, a
penalty for under-reported emissions allows regulators to maintain compliance with
imperfect monitoring, and setting this penalty as high as is practicable conserves
monitoring costs. Our analysis suggests that it is possible to maintain compliance
in a dynamic emissions trading program with imperfect monitoring, but doing so
requires focusing on punishing reporting violations rather than on punishing permit
violations.
The SO2 program is not the only program with bankable permits that imposes a
high penalty for permit violations. The EPA’s NOX Budget Trading Program (US
EPA 2004) and its recently proposed Clear Skies Initiative (US EPA 2003c) are
similar to the SO2 program in their banking provisions and most elements of their
enforcement provisions. However, the permit violation penalty in the NOx program
is a three-to-one offset from future permit allocations, while the Clear Skies permit violation penalty is one to three times the clearing price in the last auction
of permits. We examine both of these penalty schemes and conclude that, from
the perspective of minimizing enforcement costs, these penalties are also probably
excessive.
Several authors have demonstrated that when emissions permits trade across
time on a one-to-one basis and ﬁrms actually bank or borrow permits, the
price of permits increases through time at the rate of discount (Cronshaw and
Kruse 1996; Rubin 1996; Kling and Rubin 1997). From the compliance and
enforcement perspective, this implies that ﬁrms’ incentives toward noncompliance
also increase, which requires monitoring effort to increase through time if the
reporting penalty is ﬁxed. Tying the reporting penalty directly to current permit prices eliminates the need to incur increasing enforcement costs over time.
In fact, a constant level of monitoring can maintain compliance with minimal
discounted enforcement costs over the life of a program if penalties are structured so that: (1) the reporting violation penalty is a constant multiple of the
current permit price with a multiplication factor that is as high as is practicable, and (2) the permit violation penalty is set to just make up the difference between the current price and the present value of next period’s price
when borrowing is not allowed, and that is set to zero when borrowing is
allowed.

This paper contributes to and draws upon three lines of theoretical research.
The ﬁrst is the literature on self-reporting in law enforcement that we have already
mentioned. The second is the theoretical literature on intertemporal trading of
emissions permits, which has focused on banking behavior, the welfare consequences of allowing banking, and the optimal design of banking rules (Cronshaw
and Kruse 1996; Rubin 1996; Kling and Rubin 1997; Schennach 2000; Yates and
Cronshaw 2001; Leiby and Rubin 2001; Phaneuf and Requate 2002). Finally the
literature on enforcing emissions trading programs has provided insights into the
determinants of compliance and the design of enforcement strategies for these programs (Malik 1990, 1992; Keeler 1991; van Egteren and Weber 1996; Stranlund
and Dhanda 1999; Stranlund and Chavez 2000). With one exception, however, the
models of permit banking assume away the fact that emissions trading programs
must be enforced, and the models of compliance and enforcement are static models that do not allow permit banking.
Innes (2003) is the only other analysis that we are aware of that considers
enforcement with intertemporal permit trading. He argues that giving sources the
ability to bank and borrow permits eliminates the need to impose costly sanctions to maintain compliance when emissions are stochastic. However, Innes simpliﬁes his analysis by assuming that an enforcement strategy only consists of a
costly penalty for permit violations. Because he admittedly ignores the reporting
and monitoring functions of enforcement altogether, he does not address the issues
that are the main focus of this paper—the importance of self-reported emissions
under imperfect monitoring and the separate roles played by penalties for permit
violations and penalties for reporting violations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we develop a
dynamic model of compliance when permits are bankable. In section 3, which is
the heart of the paper, we derive enforcement strategies for maintaining compliance
over the life of an emissions trading program with minimal monitoring effort. In
this section we make our main case that a dynamic enforcement strategy for bankable emissions permits should focus on inducing truthful reporting of emissions,
rather than on punishing permit violations. In section 4 we draw further conclusions about how enforcement strategies should evolve over time to minimize the
present value of enforcement costs. In section 5 we modify our model to incorporate alternative trading restrictions on intertemporal permit trading, and alternative offset penalties for permit violations. In addition we discuss how enforcing a
dynamic emissions trading program differs from enforcing a static program. Section 6 concludes.

2. A Model of Compliance in a Dynamic Emissions Trading Program
The analysis of this paper is based largely on a model of compliance by a riskneutral ﬁrm in a dynamic emissions trading program that lasts T periods. Let xt
be the number of emissions permits the ﬁrm holds at the beginning of period t.
Each permit confers the legal right to release one unit of emissions. During period

t the ﬁrm chooses how many permits lt to purchase (lt > 0) or sell (lt < 0). Permits
trade in period t at a competitive price pt . A system is in place to track emissions
permits so that at any point in time the regulator has perfect information about
the number of permits held by each ﬁrm. During period t the ﬁrm also chooses
its emissions et . The ﬁrm has an abatement cost function, c(et ), which is strictly
decreasing and convex and does not vary over the life of the program.
The ﬁrm is required to submit a report, rt , of its emissions in t. At this point it
is important to distinguish between the two types of violations the ﬁrm can commit. A reporting violation occurs in period t if the ﬁrm under-reports it emissions;
that is, et > rt . A permit violation occurs when the ﬁrm holds insufﬁcient permits
to cover its emissions; that is, et > (xt + lt ). Under a trading program in which
borrowing against future permit allocations is not allowed, a permit violation can
occur in any period. However, when borrowing is allowed, emissions in excess of
permit holdings (in all periods but the last) do not constitute a violation. Excess
emissions in a period are simply paid back in a later period. In the last period no
permit borrowing is possible so excess emissions in this period constitute a permit
violation.
Implicit in the emissions report is a report of the ﬁrm’s compliance status and
whether it is banking or borrowing permits. If a ﬁrm’s reported emissions exceed
its permit holdings, rt > (xt + lt ), then the ﬁrm is reporting that it is borrowing
permits (when allowed), and is reporting a permit violation if borrowing is not
allowed. If rt < (xt + lt ), then the ﬁrm is reporting that it is banking permits. When
permit borrowing is not allowed, rt ≤ (xt + lt ) indicates that the ﬁrm is reporting
that it is permit compliant. Of course, we must distinguish reported permit violations, permit compliance, and permit banking and borrowing from their actual values. If actual emissions exceed permit holdings, et > (xt + lt ), then there is an actual
permit violation when borrowing is not allowed, or the ﬁrm is borrowing permits
when this is allowed. If et < (xt + lt ) the ﬁrm has excess permits to bank, and if
et ≤ (xt + lt ), then the ﬁrm is permit compliant when borrowing is not allowed.
Monitoring for compliance by authorities is potentially imperfect in the sense
that the probability that the authority is able to make a determination of a ﬁrm’s
compliance status is πt ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that the costs of monitoring are increasing in this probability.
In this paper we consider enforcement strategies that are structured to maintain
compliance without perfect emissions monitoring. It is worthwhile then to be clear
about the sorts of monitoring and reporting technologies that allow this, and how
they are different from the perfect (or near-perfect) strategies that employ the continuous emissions monitoring technologies that are featured in several programs,
including the SO2 program. Without continuous emissions monitoring devices it
is unlikely that an emissions trading program can be based on ﬁrms’ actual emissions. Rather, a trading program would be based on estimates of emissions that
are determined by combining such information as periodic measurements of emissions ﬂow, types and performance of abatement equipment, as well as production
data. A ﬁrm’s report then is a report of the variables that are used to calculate
estimated emissions. Monitoring by authorities produces an independent estimate

of emissions with site visits to measure emissions ﬂow and to inspect abatement
equipment, and other checks to assess the accuracy of the ﬁrm’s reported information. If the monitor ﬁnds a discrepancy with the ﬁrm’s report, and consequently
a different estimate of emissions, the ﬁrm is violating its reporting responsibilities,
and perhaps its emissions permits as well. Since this monitoring is costly, authorities are likely to monitor only a subset of ﬁrms.6
While our setup is stylized, it conforms closely to several real-world policies. For
example, in the Emissions Compensation Program of Santiago, Chile, ﬁrms report
daily emissions based on a once a year measurement of emissions ﬂow parameters.
Based on a source’s reports, regulators approximate its “actual” emissions by the
maximum amount of emissions that it could potentially emit in a given year. Regulators monitor a limited number of ﬁrms per year to perform their own measurement of the ﬂow parameters. A violation occurs if the reported ﬂow parameters
are different from the measured emissions obtained in the inspection.7 A second
example concerns major stationary sources in the United States that operate under
Title V of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. These sources are required
to report their aggregate annual emissions to their state air quality authorities
and pay fees based, at least in part, on this report of total emissions. Usually,
total emissions are estimated with periodic emissions ﬂow tests, information on raw
materials use, production schedules, and the performance of abatement equipment,
although there appears to be signiﬁcant variation in the reporting required by the
states (US GAO 2001). Agency monitoring could, in principle, involve generating
an independent estimate of emissions with the agency’s own source tests and other
checks to assess the accuracy of a ﬁrm’s report. If this strategy can be used to support the collection of emissions fees, it can be used to support an emissions trading
program.
Returning to our model development, under a system of permit trading with
no permit borrowing, permit violations in period t (whether they are revealed in
a ﬁrm’s emissions report or discovered by the authorities) are penalized at φt per
unit. This penalty corresponds to the permit violation penalty in the SO2 program. When borrowing is allowed, emissions in excess of permit holdings in periods t < T are not violations, so φt = 0 for t = 0, . . . , T − 1. In the last period
excess emissions do represent a permit violation so φT > 0. Whether or not borrowing is allowed, reporting violations that are discovered through an audit are penalized at γt per unit. Both φt and γt are scalars known by all parties.8 As mentioned
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We henceforth assume, like most other analysts, that monitoring produces a measure of emissions
that is accurate enough to determine a ﬁrm’s compliance status without errors.
For detailed accounts of the enforcement strategy and compliance results of the Emissions
Compensation Program see Palacios and Chavez (2005, 2002).
Our assumption of linear penalties (i.e., constant marginal penalties) is not common in the
literature on compliance and enforcement of emissions trading programs. However, linear penalties
are much more common for actual and proposed emissions trading programs than nonlinear
penalties (see Boemare and Quirion 2002 for examples). Our use of linear penalties is motivated,
in part, by this fact.

in the introduction, there is no penalty like γt in the SO2 regulations, although
there appears to be an avenue for punishing misreporting.
We can now deﬁne the expected penalty under a program without permit borrowing for a ﬁrm that is violating its permits and under-reporting its emissions:
f (et , lt , rt ) = φt (rt − (xt + lt )) + πt {γt (et − rt ) + φt [(et − (xt + lt )) − (rt − (xt + lt ))]}
(1)
= φt (rt − (xt + lt )) + πt (γt + φt )(et − rt ).
To understand how f (et , lt , rt ) is constructed, note that a ﬁrm that reports a
part of its permit violation faces an automatic penalty of φt (rt − (xt + lt )). If
the ﬁrm is audited so that its reporting violation is discovered (this occurs with
probability πt ), the penalty for this violation, γt (et − rt ), is assessed. Of course, if a
ﬁrm does not hold enough permits to cover its emissions and also under-reports its
emissions, it has not reported the full extent of its permit violation. If this is discovered the ﬁrm is liable for the incremental penalty for its unreported permit violation, φt (et − (xt + lt )) − φt (rt − (xt + lt ) = φt (et − rt ). When borrowing is allowed,
excess emissions in periods t < T are not violations, so we modify (1) by simply
setting φt = 0, for t = 0, . . . , T − 1. In the last period excess emissions do represent a permit violation so the expected penalty in t = T is given by (1).
Combining the elements deﬁned thus far yields the ﬁrm’s single-period expected
costs,
v(et , lt , rt , xt ) = c(et ) + pt lt + f (et , lt , rt ).

(2)

We now turn to characterizing the evolution of the ﬁrm’s stock of permits.
Assume that under a program without permit borrowing that a ﬁrm’s reporting or
permit violation in a period is offset with a one-to-one deduction from its allocation of permits in the next period. This is a characteristic of the SO2 and other
programs. The offset implies that the number of permits held by the ﬁrm at the
beginning of period t + 1, xt+1 , includes the ﬁrm’s predetermined endowment of
permits that period, l¯t+1 , plus permits saved from the previous period, or less permits deducted because of a violation discovered or reported in the previous period.
When both banking and borrowing are allowed, emissions in excess of permit
holdings in a period do not represent a violation, but are nevertheless deducted
from the ﬁrm’s permit endowment in the next period. For now we assume that
the intertemporal trading ratio for permits is one-to-one, but will brieﬂy analyze
the impact of alternative trading ratios on enforcement in section 5. Assuming that
permit violations are offset on a one-for-one basis when borrowing is not allowed
and that the intertemporal trading ratio for permits is one-to-one when borrowing
is allowed implies that a ﬁrm’s stock of permits evolves in the same way whether
borrowing is allowed or not.9

9

In a sense, permit and reporting violations when borrowing is not allowed are simply a stochastic
form of borrowing against future allocations with a potential price (penalty) for the privilege of
doing so.

From the perspective of period t choices, xt+1 is potentially a random variable
because of incomplete monitoring and the possibility of under-reporting of emissions in t. If an audit is conducted in t a ﬁrm’s actual permit shortfall, et − (xt +
lt ) > 0, or bank, et − (xt + lt ) < 0, is carried into the next period. If an audit is
not conducted the ﬁrm’s reported permit shortfall, rt − (xt + lt ) > 0, or bank, rt −
(xt + lt ) < 0, is carried forward. Thus, from the perspective of period t choices, the
expected number of permits with which the ﬁrm will begin period t + 1 is
Et (xt+1 ) = l¯t+1 + πt (xt + lt − et ) + (1 − πt )(xt + lt − rt ),

(3)

where the subscript on the expectation operator indicates that the expectation is
from the perspective of period t.
We can now specify a ﬁrm’s decision problem in its entirety. Its objective is
to choose a time path of emissions, permit transactions, and emissions reports to
minimize its discounted sum of expected costs, subject to (3), and nonnegativity
constraints for emissions, reported emissions, and permit holdings in every time
period. In the ﬁnal period the ﬁrm will never ﬁnd it advantageous to hold excess
permits or report that it holds excess permits, because excess permits at the end of
T have no value. Therefore, we will impose the constraint that eT − (xt + lT ) ≥ 0.
Formally, the ﬁrm’s problem is to choose {et , lt , rt }, t = 0, . . . , T , to solve
 T

 t
min E
β (c(et ) + pt lt + f (et , lt , rt ))
t=0

with probability πt
l¯t+1 + xt + lt − et
t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
s.t. xt+1 =
with probability 1 − πt ,
l¯t+1 + xt + lt − rt
et ≥ 0, rt ≥ 0, xt + lt ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , T ,
eT − (xT + lT ) ≥ 0,
(4)
x0 = l¯0 .
In the objective function β is the discount factor, which is assumed to be constant
over the life of the program.
The objective function and constraints speciﬁed in (4) deﬁne a discrete-time stochastic dynamic programming problem, which will be solved by developing and
analyzing the dynamic programming equation. The uncertainty in our problem
stems from incomplete monitoring: there are no other stochastic elements in the
problem. In particular, we assume that each ﬁrm can accurately forecast equilibrium permit prices over the life of the policy. Deﬁne Jt (xt ) as minimum expected
discounted costs from period t on through the last period, given that the ﬁrm has
xt permits at the beginning of t. The stochastic dynamic programming equation is
then
Jt (xt ) = min c(et ) + pt lt + f (et , lt , rt ) + βEt [Jt+1 (xt+1 )],
et ,lt ,rt

(5)

subject to the constraints speciﬁed in (4). The dynamic programming equation has
the usual interpretation: it balances the effects of decisions et , lt , and rt on period

t expected costs against the effects of these decisions through the state equation (3)
on minimum discounted expected costs from t + 1 on through the last period.
The regulator’s objective is to induce full compliance in every period with minimal enforcement effort. Therefore, from the ﬁrm’s period t choices we will derive
an enforcement strategy to motivate it to be compliant in this period, given full
compliance in all future periods. By induction, we will derive an enforcement strategy that will induce full compliance in every period. This approach is equivalent
to deriving the enforcement strategy by backward induction. Using this approach
we can specify Et [Jt+1 (xt+1 )] up to a constant. The following lemma is proved in
Appendix A.
Lemma 1:

Given full compliance in periods j = t + 1, . . . , T ,

Et [Jt+1 (xt+1 )] = −pt+1 [πt (xt + lt − et ) + (1 − πt )(xt + lt − rt )] + C̃t+1 ,

(6)

for some constant C̃t+1 .
Equation (6) reveals that from the perspective of possibly noncompliant choices
in period t, βEt [Jt+1 (xt+1 )], is the discounted expected value of the number
of permits the ﬁrm will carry into period t + 1 plus a constant term. Since
βEt [Jt+1 (xt+1 )] is minimum discounted expected costs from t + 1 on through the
last period, we interpret the marginal effects of period t choices on βEt [Jt+1 (xt+1 )]
as the marginal future costs of beginning t + 1 with fewer permits. A ﬁrm’s compliance choices in a period will depend in large measure on these marginal future
costs. Likewise, these costs will be important determinants of the enforcement
strategy we propose.
Combining (5) and (6), the value function in any period t = 0, . . . , T − 1 is
Jt (xt ) = min c(et ) + pt lt + f (et , lt , rt ) − βpt+1 [πt (xt + lt − et ) + (1 − πt )(xt + lt − rt )] + β C̃t+1
et ,lt ,rt

s.t. et ≥ 0, rt ≥ 0, xt + lt ≥ 0.

(7)

In the last period, JT (xT ) = min c(eT ) + pT lT + f (eT , lT , rT ), subject to eT ≥ 0,
eT ,lT ,rT

rT ≥ 0, xt + lT ≥ 0, and eT − (xt + lT ) ≥ 0.

3. Enforcing Emissions Trading with Bankable Permits
Having derived the value function for each period t = 0, . . . , T puts us in a
position to derive enforcement strategies that achieve perfect compliance for each
period of an emissions trading program with minimal enforcement costs. For the
derivation of the appropriate enforcement strategy, it turns out that we do not
need to specify the optimal choice of emissions, other than to assume throughout

that et > 0. We need only focus on the emissions report, rt , and permit transactions, lt , given positive emissions in t.10
Consider the objective function of (7). Let emissions, permit transactions and
the emissions report in period t vary from their optimal values and use (1) to substitute for f (et , lt , rt ). We can then rewrite the objective function of (7) as
J (xt ; et , lt , rt ) = c(et ) + pt lt + φt (rt − (xt + lt )) + πt (γt + φt )(et − rt )
−βpt+1 [πt (xt + lt − et ) + (1 − πt )(xt + lt − rt )] + β C̃t+1 ,

(8)

where recall that when both banking and borrowing of permits is allowed, φt = 0
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1. We have dropped the time subscript on J to simplify the notation; from now on a subscript on J denotes a ﬁrst derivative. We have also written
the value function explicitly as a function of the variables et , lt , and rt . Because of
the linear penalties, (8) is linear in a ﬁrm’s emissions report and its permit transactions. This is convenient because it allows us a more intuitive derivation of the
appropriate enforcement strategies by focusing solely on J, rather than deriving
enforcement strategies from the ﬁrst-order conditions for (7).
3.1. The Evolution of Permit Prices
With bankable emissions permits, any enforcement strategy must account for
the evolution of permit prices over time. Therefore, to guide our development of
enforcement strategies we need some fundamental results about the evolution of
permit prices.
Suppose at ﬁrst that permit borrowing is not allowed. Previous work has shown
that intertemporal equilibrium in a permit market under certainty requires that
real permit prices be nonincreasing across time periods, and that ﬁrms will bank
permits only when real permit prices are expected to remain constant (Cronshaw
and Kruse 1996; Rubin 1996). This is true when you allow for noncompliance in
a period as well.11 To see why, note that if a ﬁrm is in permit violation in t, the
derivative of (8) with respect to lt is Jl = pt − βpt+1 − φt . If the ﬁrm is permit compliant the ﬁrm does not face the penalty for permit violations, soJl = pt − β pt+1 .
Whether a ﬁrm is permit compliant or not,pt < βpt+1 implies Jl < 0 for every ﬁrm.
This inequality implies that all ﬁrms would demand an unbounded number of permits in t. Since this cannot be true in equilibrium, we must have pt ≥ βpt+1 . Now
suppose that pt > βpt+1 , but that a ﬁrm is banking permits in t. Since the ﬁrm
is banking permits it is permit compliant and Jl = pt − βpt+1 > 0. However, the
inequality implies that the ﬁrm could reduce it expected compliance costs from

10

Given the achievement of perfect compliance and permit market equilibrium in every period, it is
easy to demonstrate the standard result that a ﬁrm’s emissions choice in any period t is
determined by c (et ) + pt = 0. The proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix A derives and uses this result.
11 It is important to recall that all period-t results are derived under the assumption of full
compliance in all future periods. The characteristics of permit price paths that we present are not
guaranteed to hold if there is noncompliance in future periods.

t on by reducing its permit holdings so that it is not holding excess permits. The
contradiction implies that ﬁrms will bank permits in period t only if pt = βpt+1 .
Now suppose that both permit borrowing and banking are allowed. Then intertemporal permit market equilibrium requires that real permit prices are constant throughout (Kling and Rubin 1997). The reasoning is simple. If pt > βpt+1 ,
then all ﬁrms will demand zero permits in t, and if pt < βpt+1 , then all ﬁrms will
demand an unbounded number of permits. Since neither of these cases are consistent with permit market equilibrium, we must have pt = βpt+1 .
3.2. Enforcement when Permit Borrowing is not Allowed
We now turn to deriving enforcement strategies, and ﬁrst consider the case in
which permit borrowing is not allowed. Making the common assumption that if
a ﬁrm is indifferent between compliance and violation that it chooses compliance,
from (8), a ﬁrm truthfully reports its emissions in period t if and only if enforcement is designed so that
Jr = φt − πt (γt + φt ) + (1 − πt )βpt+1 ≤ 0.

(9)

That is, reporting violations are deterred if and only if a ﬁrm’s expected compliance costs from period t on are not increasing in its emissions report in t.12
Similarly, permit violations in period t are deterred if and only if the enforcement
strategy induces
Jl = pt − βpt+1 − φt ≤ 0.

(10)

To interpret (9) rearrange it to obtain πt (γt + φt ) ≥ (1 − πt )βpt+1 + φt . There are
two reasons a ﬁrm may choose to under-report its emissions. One is to cover up a
permit violation while the other is to carry additional permits into the next period.
On the left-hand side of the relation above, πt (γt + φt ), is the expected marginal
penalty for a reporting violation and the undisclosed part of a permit violation.
On the right-hand side term, (1 − πt )βpt+1 + φt , is the expected marginal beneﬁt of
under-reporting emissions: (1 − πt )βpt+1 is the expected discounted marginal beneﬁt of carrying additional permits into the next period because emission are underreported, while φt is the certain unit penalty for the part of the permit violation
that the ﬁrm avoids by under-reporting its emissions.
The intuition of (10) is as follows. Suppose that a ﬁrm contemplates a permit
violation in period t. We can interpret the current permit price as the marginal
beneﬁt of a current permit violation, because it is the unit cost of purchasing additional permits to come into compliance. On the other hand, the discounted permit
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A ﬁrm will never report that its emissions are higher than they really are. There is no beneﬁt to
the ﬁrm of over-reporting its emissions. However, if a ﬁrm is violating its permits, over-reporting
increases the certain penalty for reported permit violations without changing the reporting penalty
it faces, which would be zero anyway. Moreover, whether the ﬁrm is violating its permits or not,
over-reporting of emissions reduces the number of permits it begins the next period with.

price in the next period is the discounted marginal increase in future expected costs
from carrying fewer permits into period t + 1. Thus, the discounted permit price
in the next period is part of the marginal cost of a current permit violation. The
other part is, of course, the unit penalty φt .
Achieving perfect compliance with minimal enforcement costs in periods
t = 0, . . . , T − 1 requires satisfying (9) and (10) with minimal monitoring. From
(9), this implies
that monitoring in each period t should be set so that πt =

(φt + βpt+1 ) (γt + φt + βpt+1 ). Note that the required probability of detection is
monotonically increasing in the permit violation penalty, φt . This is due to the fact
that increasing the permit violation penalty increases the incentive ﬁrms have to
under-report their emissions. To offset this increased incentive, monitoring must be
increased. To conserve monitoring costs, therefore, φt should be set as low as possible while maintaining (10); that is, φt = pt − βpt+1 . Note also that the required
probability of detection is decreasing in the penalty from a reporting violation. If
no such penalty exists (γt = 0), the probability of detection must be set to one to
ensure full compliance.
These conclusions hold in the last period as well. The objective function in the
last period is JT (xT , eT , lT , rT ) = c(eT ) + pT lT + φT (rT − (xT + lT )) + πT (γT +
φT )(eT − rT ). Truthful emission reporting is achieved if and only if Jr = φT −
πT (γT + φT ) ≤ 0, and permit compliance is achieved if and only if Jl = pT − φT ≤ 0.
Achieving Jr ≤ 0 with minimal monitoring, given φT , requires πT = φT (γT + φT ).
As in all previous periods, however, πT is increasing in φT , implying that φT
should be set as low as possible; that is, φT = pT .
Thus achieving and maintaining compliance with minimal enforcement costs
when permit borrowing is not allowed requires:

πt = (φt + βpt+1 ) (γt + φt + βpt+1 ) for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
(11)

πT = φT (γT + φT ),
(12)
φt = pt − βpt+1
φT = pT .

for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,

(13)
(14)

This enforcement strategy along with the conditions for the evolution of prices we
presented earlier have important implications for the design of enforcement in an
dynamic emission trading system when permit borrowing is not allowed. For all
time periods before the last, (13) indicates that the permit violation penalty should
be set to exactly make up the difference between the current permit price and
the discounted price in the next period. Therefore in periods in which ﬁrms are
banking permits so that real permit prices are constant across periods, this penalty
should be set to zero. In other words, the permit violation penalty serves no deterrence role when real permit prices are constant. A positive permit violation penalty
is needed to deter permit violations in periods in which ﬁrms are not banking permits and real permit prices are falling, but again it should just cover the difference between the current price and the discounted price in the next period. In the

last period the permit violation penalty should be set at the equilibrium permit
price. At no point should the permit violation penalty exceed the current permit
price.
These conclusions contrast sharply with the permit violation penalty in the SO2
Allowance program, which has always been many times higher than prevailing
permit prices. Our analysis suggests that there is no gain to setting such a high
penalty. To deter permit violations, given truthful reporting, the penalty only needs
to cover the difference between the current period price and the present value of
next period’s price. Setting the penalty higher than this increases enforcement costs
when monitoring is imperfect because it increases the amount of monitoring necessary to induce truthful emissions reports. Therefore, it cannot be increased to conserve monitoring effort. In this sense the permit violation penalty has only limited
deterrence value.
From the monitoring conditions (11) and (12), it is clear that the reporting violation penalty, γt , plays a crucial role when monitoring is imperfect. In fact, compliance can be maintained with imperfect monitoring if and only if the reporting
violation penalty is positive. Moreover, the monitoring requirement is monotonically decreasing in this penalty, suggesting that setting it as high as is practicable
will conserve monitoring costs.
3.3. Enforcement when Both Permit Banking and Borrowing are Allowed
Allowing permit borrowing changes the required enforcement strategy in a simple way. Since emissions in excess of permit holdings do not constitute a violation in each period but the last, we modify (8) by setting the permit violation
penalty, φt , equal to zero in each period but the last, and focus on inducing truthful emissions reporting in these periods. Thus when borrowing is allowed a ﬁrm
truthfully reports its emissions if and only if Jr = −πt γt + (1 − πt)βpt+1 ≤ 0. Minimal monitoring to induce truthful reporting requires πt = βpt+1 (γt + βpt+1 ). In
the last period, emissions in excess of permit holdings would constitute a violation. Thus the enforcement strategy to induce both reporting and permit compliance in the last period of a program with permit borrowing is the same as the
last period enforcement strategy when borrowing is not allowed. Putting all the elements together, the following strategy guarantees complete compliance with minimum enforcement costs in an emissions trading program with both banking and
borrowing:

πt = βpt+1 (γt + βpt+1 )

πT = φT (γT + φT ),
φT = pT .

for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,

(15)
(16)
(17)

As when permit borrowing is not allowed, compliance can be maintained with
imperfect monitoring if and only if the reporting violation penalty is positive, and
setting it as high as possible conserves monitoring costs.

4. The Evolution of Enforcement
While the enforcement strategies we propose suggests how a policy of emissions
trading with bankable permits should be enforced in every period, the particular
evolution of enforcement and the present value of enforcement costs over the life
of a program will depend on the dynamics of permit prices. In this section we
draw further conclusions about the evolution of enforcement over time. Because
the enforcement strategies we propose induce perfect compliance in every period,
we can simply combine our analysis with existing models of the evolution of permit prices that implicitly assume perfect and costless enforcement.13
As before let us begin with a program that precludes permit borrowing. Schennach (2000) has provided a theoretical analysis of the time paths of aggregate emissions and permit prices in a model with bankable permits that she constructed to
mimic the SO2 regulations. In Schennach’s analysis, an industry with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms faces an aggregate emissions standard that is relatively high in the ﬁrst
phase of an emissions trading program, but then is reduced in the second phase.
Given her implicit assumption that enforcement induces complete compliance, as
well as her explicit assumptions that abatement costs and the discount rate do not
change over time and that there is no uncertainty about future permit prices, she
shows that ﬁrms will save permits during the ﬁrst phase of the program to smooth
out the decrease in the aggregate standard. During this banking period the price of
permits rises at the rate of discount (that is, pt = βpt+1 ). At some point during the
second phase of the program, say t¯, the permit bank is exhausted. Thereafter, facilities in aggregate will hold their emissions to the aggregate standard imposed in
every period of the second phase, and the permit price remains constant. In sum,
then, the emissions permit price is at its minimum of p0 in the initial period of the
policy, it rises at the rate of discount through the banking phase until it reaches a
maximum at pt¯, and remains at that level until the termination of the program.
What would the price path derived by Schennach imply for the evolution of
the enforcement strategy (11)–(14)? Combine the conditions on monitoring, (11)
and (12), with the conditions on the permit violation penalty, (13) and (14), to
obtain πt = pt (γt + pt ) for each t = 0, . . . , T . Since permit prices rise while ﬁrms
are banking permits, to ensure perfect compliance either the level of monitoring or
the unit penalty for reporting violations must also rise during this phase. This is so
because higher permit prices increase the incentive for ﬁrms to under-report their
emissions. Since increasing monitoring is costly but increasing penalties is not, it
is clear that to minimize the present value of monitoring costs over the life of the
program it is the reporting violation penalty that should respond as the permit
price increases, not the level of monitoring. A simple way to accomplish this is by
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It would not be possible to use existing results about equilibrium price paths if we were to analyze
imperfect compliance. Weak enforcement and signiﬁcant noncompliance will likely change
equilibrium price paths in ways that have not yet been examined. We feel that this would be an
interesting area for future research.

tying the reporting violation penalty directly to the current permit price; that is,
by setting γt = gpt , where g is a ﬁxed positive constant.
With this approach the

required level of monitoring is a constant, πt = pt (gpt + pt ) = 1 (g + 1), throughout the entire program. More importantly, with g set as high as is practicable, the
present value of enforcement costs over the life of the program is minimized.
The permit violation penalty should also increase as the market evolves, but only
in three discrete jumps. During the banking period this penalty should be set to
zero. Given that the permit price is equal to pt¯ when the banking period is over,
the permit violation penalty should be set at φt = pt − βpt+1 = (1 − β)pt¯, until the
last period when it should be increased to φT = pt¯.
Now let us allow for permit borrowing. Recall that when permits can be banked
and borrowed, permit prices increase at the rate of discount.
 Combining (15), (16),
and (17), with pt = βpt+1 , t = 0, . . . , T − 1, yields πt = pt (γt + pt ) for each t =
0, . . . , T . Once again if the reporting violation penalty is ﬁxed through time, then
monitoring must increase as prices increase. Again, tying this penalty directly to
the
 permit price by setting γt = gpt yields a constant probability of detection, πt =
1 (g + 1), and minimizes the present value of enforcement costs over the life of
the program.
There is a precedent for tying penalties to current permit prices. The EPA’s
recently proposed Clear Skies Initiative calls for a unit penalty for permit violations that is tied to the clearing price in the most recent auction of permits (US
EPA 2003c). Within 30 days after the end of a compliance period, a ﬁrm with
excess emissions for the period must offset these excess emissions with an equal
number of permits and pay a ﬁnancial penalty that is equal to the clearing price in
the latest EPA auction. After 30 days the penalty increases to three times the latest
auction price. In contrast to our suggestion to tie the reporting violation penalty
to going permits prices, Clear Skies ties the permit violation penalty to prices.
Since the Clear Skies Initiative allows unrestricted permit banking (but not borrowing), we can easily incorporate its permit violation penalty into our analysis. Suppose that auctioned permits and traded permits carry the same price in
a period, and let us set φt = hpt , where h is a positive constant. Then, from
(11), reporting violations are deterred
 with minimal monitoring for periods t =
0, 1, . . . , T − 1, by πt = (hpt + βpt+1 ) (γt + hpt + βpt+1 ). From (10), permit violations are deterred if and only if hpt ≥ pt − βpt+1 . Notice that the required monitoring is again increasing in the permit violation penalty, so enforcement with
minimal monitoring requires that h be set to satisfy hpt = pt − βpt+1 , or rather
(h − 1)pt = −βpt+1 . It is clear then that h should be less than one in all periods.
Therefore, from the perspective of minimizing the enforcement costs of inducing
compliance, the ﬁnancial penalties for permit violations in the Clear Skies Initiative appear to be excessive.
Furthermore, even though the Clear Skies permit violation penalty is tied to
going permit prices, it cannot by itself eliminate the need to increase monitoring as
permit prices increase over time. To see why, suppose that ﬁrms are banking permits so that pt = βpt+1 across time periods. Substituting this into the monitoring


requirement yields πt = (h + 1)pt (γt + (h + 1)pt ). Clearly, without also tying the
reporting violation penalty to the current permit price, more monitoring effort
must be applied as permit prices increase over time.

5. Further Analysis and Discussion
5.1. Intertemporal Trading Ratios and Offset Penalties
Thus far we have assumed that permits trade across periods on a one-to-one
basis when both banking and borrowing are allowed. When borrowing is not
allowed we have assumed that permit and reporting violations in one period are
offset from the next period permit allocation, also on a one-to-one basis. Both of
these features are modiﬁed in proposed and actual emissions market designs. For
example, several authors have noted that unrestricted banking and borrowing of
permits on a one-for-one basis is not likely to be efﬁcient. Kling and Rubin (1997)
show that with stationary abatement costs and pollution damages from a ﬂow pollutant, the optimal path of aggregate emissions is constant through time. However,
unrestricted banking and borrowing will motivate ﬁrms to shift emissions toward
the present in order to push abatement costs off into the future. To motivate ﬁrms
to choose the optimal path of emissions, they propose a system of bankable permits in which permits trade across time at a ratio that is the inverse of the discount
factor. That is, banked permits grow at the rate 1/β, while borrowed permits must
be paid back at that rate. This intertemporal trading ratio discourages the inefﬁcient banking that occurs if permits trade across time on a one-to-one basis.14
Furthermore, at least one existing program with permit banking, but not borrowing, penalizes permit violations with an offset from future permit allocations
instead of a ﬁnancial penalty. In the EPA’s NOX Budget Trading Program permit
violations are penalized with an offset from a future permit allocation on a threeto-one basis.15 One-to-one banking of permits is allowed in this program, except
for an aggregate restriction.16
To incorporate alternative intertemporal trading ratios or alternative offset penalties into our analysis, we ﬁrst generalize the state equation (3) in the following

14

15
16

The efﬁcient trading ratio must be modiﬁed if abatement costs and/or pollution damages are not
stationary. Other authors have examined the optimal intertemporal trading ratio under a variety
of circumstances: Leiby and Rubin (2001) in the case of a pollutant that causes both stock and
ﬂow damages; Yates and Cronshaw (2001) when regulators are uncertain about ﬁrms’ abatement
costs, and Innes (2003) when emissions are stochastic.
Similarly, the penalty for excess emissions by Annex 1 countries under the Kyoto Protocol is an
offset of 1.3 for each unit of excess emissions (Barrett 2003, pp. 384–385).
If the aggregate bank of permits exceeds 10% of the total allocation of permits in a year, this
triggers what is called “progressive ﬂow control”, which in effect implies a very heavy discounting
of banked permits (US EPA 2004).

way:
Et (xt+1 ) = l¯t+1 + µ[πt (xt + lt − et ) + (1 − πt )(xt + lt − rt )],
 0
µ if xt + lt − et ≥ 0 or xt + lt − rt ≥ 0,
µ=
µ1 if xt + lt − et < 0 or xt + lt − rt < 0.

(18)

Alternative intertemporal trading ratios when permits can be banked and borrowed
can be modeled by setting µ = µ0 = µ1 . Modeling a program with unrestricted
banking, but no borrowing, that penalizes permit violations with an offset instead
of a ﬁnancial penalty implies φt = 0, µ0 = 1, and µ1 > 1.
With (18), Lemma 1 in section 2 is the same except that equation (6) becomes
Et [Jt+1 (xt+1 )] = −µpt+1 [πt (xt + lt − et ) + (1 − πt )(xt + lt − rt )] + C̃t+1 . (The proof of
Lemma 1 using the state equation (18) proceeds in the very same fashion). The
value function (8) is similarly modiﬁed: J (xt ; et , lt , rt ) = c(et ) + pt lt + φt (rt − (xt +
lt )) + πt (γt + φt )(et − rt ) − βµpt+1 [πt (xt + lt − et ) + (1 − πt )(xt + lt − rt )] + β C̃t+1 .
As before, all reporting violations in t < T are deterred if and only if Jr ≤ 0. Doing
so with minimal monitoring requires πt = (φt + µβpt+1 ) (γt + φt + µβpt+1 ). When
permit borrowing is not allowed, permit violations are deterred if and only if
Jl = pt − µβpt+1 − φt ≤ 0.
Consider a program with both banking and borrowing and an intertemporal
trading ratio µ = µ0 = µ1 . In this case the equilibrium price path is partially
characterized by pt = µβpt+1 . Since permits can be borrowed, there is no permit violation penalty for all periods except the ﬁnal period. Therefore,
deterring

(γ
=
µβp
+
µβp
reporting
violations
with
minimal
monitoring
requires
π
t
t
t+1
t+1 ) =

pt (γt + pt ). This is exactly the same monitoring strategy that is required when
permits trade across time on a one-to-one basis. However, since the trading ratio
affects the equilibrium path of permit prices, it also affects the evolution of ﬁrms’
incentives to under-report their emissions. As before, tying the reporting violation penalty to the equilibrium permit
price by setting γt = gpt implies a con
stant monitoring probability, πt = 1 (g + 1), for all periods. In general this strategy
makes monitoring independent of the evolution of permit prices, and consequently,
independent of the intertemporal trading ratio. Clearly, then, the same monitoring
strategy can be applied for all alternative trading ratios.
Now consider a program with one-for-one permit banking, but no permit borrowing, that penalizes permit violations with only an offset penalty; that is, µ0 =
1, µ1 > 1, and φt = 0. The required level of monitoring in this case is πt =
µ1 βpt+1 (γt + µ1 βpt+1 ), which is clearly increasing in the offset penalty. As with a
ﬁnancial penalty for permit violations, a higher offset penalty increases the incentive ﬁrms have to under-report their emissions. Thus, the offset should be set as
low as possible while making sure that all permit violations are deterred; that is,
µ1 should be chosen to satisfy pt − µ1 βpt+1 = 0.
With violations deterred and no permit borrowing, the equilibrium price path
evolves in the same fashion as when permit violations are deterred by a ﬁnancial
penalty; that is, market equilibrium requires pt ≥ βpt+1 , and ﬁrms bank permits
only if pt = βpt+1 . Thus, if ﬁrms are banking permits, pt − µ1 βpt+1 = pt (1 − µ1 ) = 0,

indicating that the offset should be set to one. If ﬁrms are not banking permits
and pt > βpt+1 , then the offset is µ1 = pt /βpt+1 . As we are discovering with high
permit violation penalties of all forms, from the perspective of minimizing enforcement costs, the three-to-one offset penalty in the NOX Budget Trading Program
appears to be too high. Setting the offset at such a high level only makes sense if
ﬁrms are not banking permits because real permit prices are continually falling by
two-thirds across time periods.
5.2. Comparison to Static Enforcement
An important conclusion of our analysis is that a permit violation penalty appears
to play only a minor role in maintaining compliance in an emissions trading program with bankable permits. The existing literature on compliance and enforcement
of emissions trading programs reaches the opposite conclusion. This literature examines only static models, and only a few papers in this literature examine enforcement with self-reported emissions. Without self-reporting (for example the models
of Malik 1990, 1992; Keeler 1991; van Egteren and Weber 1996; Stranlund and
Dhanda 1999), a permit violation penalty plays an important role in maintaining
compliance with imperfect monitoring and increasing this penalty reduces monitoring costs. Thus, at least one reason for our ﬁnding that a high permit violation
penalty serves no purpose is the presence of the self-reporting requirement. Recall
that we argued in the introduction, however, that requiring self-reported emissions
is a necessary component of any enforcement strategy for bankable permits when
monitoring is imperfect. Therefore, one cannot simply eliminate the self-reporting
requirement to restore the importance of permit violation penalties.
It is important to note a clear distinction between enforcing static and dynamic
emissions trading programs that is revealed in the preceding discussion: self-reporting in not necessary to maintain compliance in static settings, but it is critical in
dynamic settings.
While the self-reporting requirement is an important factor in our ﬁnding that
the permit violation penalty has only limited deterrence value in enforcing dynamic
emissions trading programs, it cannot be the sole factor. Stranlund and Chavez
(2000) included a self-reporting requirement in a static model of compliance in
an emissions trading program, and also concluded that permit violation penalties can be increased to conserve monitoring costs. The difference between our
results and those in Stranlund and Chavez (2000) is not due to the fact that one
is dynamic while the other is static. The difference is due to the fact that Stranlund and Chavez use strictly convex penalty functions, while we use linear penalties
to mimic the penalty structure in real-world enforcement scenarios. Using linear
penalties in the Stranlund and Chavez model would yield a result identical to the
one we derive for the last period of our dynamic model in which we conclude that
the permit violation penalty cannot be used to conserve monitoring costs. Overall
then, it is the self-reporting requirement together with linear penalties for reporting and permit violations that drives the contrast between our ﬁnding that a permit violation penalty provides only limited deterrence and the opposite conclusion
one would obtain from the rest of the related literature.

Usually, however, the permit violation penalty should be much lower in the
dynamic case that in a static setting. In the static setting with self-reported emissions, the permit violation penalty should be set at the going permit price. This is
true in the last period of a trading program with bankable permits as well. In all
previous periods, however, when permit borrowing is not allowed, the permit violation penalty should be set to make up the difference between real permit prices
across periods; that is, φt = pt − βpt+1 . When real permit prices are constant across
periods the permit violation penalty is set to zero. On the other hand, suppose
that ﬁrms are not banking permits in a period because the permit price in the
next period is expected to be the same as this period’s price. Then, φt = pt (1 − β),
which normally implies a penalty that is a small fraction of the current permit
price. For example, if ﬁrms discount future expected compliance costs with a discount rate of 6%, then the permit violation penalty is set to only about 5.5% of
the current permit price.
Perhaps the most important insight Stranlund and Chavez’s (2000) static analysis holds in the dynamic context as well. The required enforcement strategies for
bankable emissions permits do not depend on information about the ﬁrms’ abatement costs: they only depend on how permit prices evolve. Thus, if the penalty
schedules are applied uniformly to all ﬁrms and permits are traded competitively
so that all ﬁrms face the same permit price, no ﬁrm-speciﬁc information is required
to set the appropriate enforcement strategy. Information about their production or
emissions-control technologies, or their abatement costs more generally, is simply
not useful to an enforcer. This is due to the fact that ﬁrms’ compliance incentives
are independent of their abatement costs. In contrast to the static case, however,
ﬁrms’ compliance incentives in the dynamic case may differ if they use different
discount rates or form different beliefs about how permit prices will evolve.

6. Conclusion
We have proposed enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with
bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal
enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported primarily by a unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly
to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from the enforcement strategies of several EPA programs—the SO2 Allowance Trading, NOX Budget Trading, and the Clear Skies programs—that emphasize high unit penalties
for permit violations. We ﬁnd that a permit violation penalty plays only a limited deterrence role and, in particular, that this penalty cannot be used to conserve
monitoring effort. In fact, setting this penalty at a high level appears to increase
the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance, because it increases
the incentive ﬁrms have to under-report their emissions. In contrast, a unit penalty
for reporting violations allows regulators to achieve full compliance with imperfect monitoring, and increasing this penalty reduces the level of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance. Moreover, tying this penalty directly to going permit

prices allows regulators to monitor ﬁrms at a constant level in every compliance
period over the life of an emissions trading program.
Our analysis has important policy implications because it suggests that compliance in emissions trading programs with bankable permits can be maintained with
imperfect monitoring, but only if regulators focus on penalizing reporting violations rather than permit violations. In particular, this conclusion might broaden
the possible application of emissions trading programs to include contexts in which
perfect monitoring is impractical or too costly.
Our analysis can be extended in several directions. Perhaps the most obvious
extension is to examine how our results would change under uncertainty. The strategies we have derived make enforcement dependent on the evolution of permit
prices; thus, uncertainty about future permit prices undoubtedly implies that the
enforcement strategy would be modiﬁed to account for this uncertainty. It seems
unlikely, however, that the main qualitative conclusions of our work would be
invalidated. However, designing an optimal policy with uncertainty about aggregate
abatement costs may cause one to consider a different role for the permit violation
penalty. In this case, the permit violation penalty may be employed as a “safetyvalve” tax that would allow ﬁrms to pay a price to escape the burden of unexpectedly high abatement costs (Roberts and Spence 1976). Even in this case, though, it
is likely that enforcing self-reporting of emissions with a high reporting violation
penalty that is tied to the current permit price would remain an important characteristic of the optimal policy.
It would also be useful to modify our model to examine the consequences of
noncompliance in an emissions trading program with bankable permits. We have
focused on strategies that maintain perfect compliance, but to have a more complete understanding of compliance and enforcement of programs with bankable
permits it would be worthwhile to have some understanding of the consequences
of not enforcing these programs well. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate how noncompliance, either because of permit or reporting violations, affects
banking behavior and equilibrium paths of prices and emissions.
In general, continuing to extend the theoretical foundations of designing and
enforcing emissions trading programs in dynamic environments will yield important insights into how regulatory authorities can implement and manage these programs more efﬁciently.

Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1:
1A and 1B

To prove the desired result, we require the following Lemmas

Lemma 1A: For all periods s for which the ﬁrm is perfectly compliant, if Js+1 (xs+1 )
= −ps+1 xs+1 + Cs+1 , then Js (xs ) = −ps xs + Cs , for some constants Cs+1 and Cs .

Proof of Lemma 1A: Full compliance in period s implies that no penalties are
collected in this period. Therefore, using (2),
v(es , ls , rs , xs ) = c(es ) + ps ls .

(A.1)

Furthermore, truthful reporting in s (rs = es ) implies from the state equation (3)
that
xs+1 = l s+1 + xs + ls − es .

(A.2)

Note that xs+1 is deterministic, which implies that Js+1 (xs+1 ) is also deterministic. Using this fact, the assumption that Js+1 (xs+1 ) = −ps+1 xs+1 + Cs+1 , (A.1), and
(A.2), the period s value function is
Js (xs ) = min c(es ) + ps ls + βJs+1 (xs+1 )
es ,ls

= min c(es ) + ps ls − βps+1 (l¯s+1 + xs + ls − es ) + Cs+1 .
es ,ls

(A.3)

Note that Js (xs ) is linear in ls . Differentiate (A.3) with respect to ls to obtain
ps − βps+1 . Note ﬁrst that if ps < βps+1 , then all ﬁrms demand an unbounded
number of permits. Since this is inconsistent with permit market equilibrium, we
can ignore this case.
When permit borrowing is allowed ps > βps+1 is also inconsistent with permit
market equilibrium, because this motivates all ﬁrms to divest themselves of all
their permits in s. Therefore, permit market equilibrium requires ps = βps+1 (Kling
and Rubin 1997). Substitute this into (A.3) to obtain
Js (xs ) = min c(es ) − ps (xs − es ) − βps+1 l¯s+1 + Cs+1 .
es ,ls

(A.4)

The optimal choice of emissions, ēs ,is uniquely determined by c (es ) + ps = 0. Substitute ēs into (A.4) to obtain
Js (xs ) = −ps xs + Cs ,

(A.5)

where Cs = c(ēs ) + ps ēs − βps+1 l¯s+1 + Cs+1 is a constant.
When permit borrowing is not allowed, ps > βps+1 could be consistent with permit market equilibrium if ﬁrms are not banking permits (Rubin 1996). Again all
ﬁrms have the incentive to divest themselves of all their permits in s, but then all
ﬁrms would be violating their permits. However, the assumption of full compliance
in s implies that enforcement prevents this from occurring, and a ﬁrm holds just
enough permits to cover its emissions; that is, xs + ls = es . Substitute this into (A.3)
to obtain
Js (xs ) = min c(es ) + ps (es − xs ) − βps+1 l¯s+1 + Cs+1 .
es ,ls

Since this is identical to (A.4), we have Js (xs ) = −ps xs + Cs , where Cs is a constant.

When borrowing is not allowed, but ﬁrms are banking permits, permit market equilibrium requires ps = βps+1 . Then, as when permit borrowing is allowed, Js (xs ) = −ps xs +
Cs , where Cs is a constant. Therefore, we have the desired result.

Lemma 1B: The period-j value function is Jj (xj ) = −pj xj + Cj , for some constants Cj , j = t + 1, . . . , T .
Proof of Lemma 1B: Given perfect compliance in T and JT +1 (xT +1 ) = 0, we
have JT (xT ) = min c(eT ) + pT lT . Permit compliance in T implies lT = eT − xT and
eT ,lT

JT (xT ) = min c(eT ) + pT (eT − xT ). Upon substitution of the optimal eT , derived
eT

from c (eT ) + pT = 0, we have JT (xT ) = −pT xt + CT . Using Lemma 1A, by induction the period T −, T − 2, . . . , t + 1 value functions take the same form, which is
the desired result.

From Lemma 1B, Jt+1 (xt+1 ) = −pt+1 xt+1 + Ct+1 , for some constant Ct+1 .
From the perspective of possibly non-compliant period t choices, Et [Jt+1 (xt+1 )] =
−pt+1 Et (xt+1 ) + Ct+1 . Upon substitution of the state equation (3) we have
Et [Jt+1 (xt+1 )] = −pt+1 [l¯t+1 + πt (xt + lt − et ) + (1 − πt )(xt + lt − rt )] + Ct+1 .
= −pt+1 [πt (xt + lt − et ) + (1 − πt )(xt + lt − rt )] + C̃t+1 ,
where C̃t+1 = −pt+1 l¯t+1 + Ct+1 is a constant. The proof of Lemma 1 is complete. 
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